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United States v. TIC Investment Corporation'
by Marc D. Poston
1. INTRODUCTION
The United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency reports that 73 million
Americans live within four miles of a site
that is contaminated with hazardous sub-
stances.' The health, safety, and environ-
mental risks posed by these sites
prompted a public outcry to remedy this
problem. By enacting the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion & Liability Act (CERCLA), Congress
required those responsible for the con-
tamination to pay the costs of remedia-
tion.3  This has raised questions
concerning the applicability of CERCLA
(also known as Superfund) against corpo-
rate officers and parent corporations, par-
ties which have traditionally been
protected from tort liability. Until the deci-
sion in United States v. TIC Investment
Corporation (TICI), courts have failed to
establish a standard for determining liabil-
ity against officers and parent
corporations that arrange for the disposal
of hazardous substances.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1971, White Farm Equipment
Company (WFE) became the owner and
operator of a "form implement manufac-
turing plant in Charles City, Iowa."'
Hazardous waste generated at the plant
was disposed of at a dumpsite owned by
H.E. Construction Company (HEC).
HEC transported the waste to the dump-
site in accordance to an agreement with
WFE. 6
In 1980, TICI purchased WFE. TICI
owned WFE for only one year, when TIC
United Corporation (TICU), purchased the
company. Although TICI and TICU were
the new owners of WFE, disposal prac-
tices continued through 1985.' Through-
out this period, Stratton Georgoulis was
the sole shareholder, president, and
chairman of the board of both TICI and
TICU.' Georgoulis also acted as the
chairman of the board for WFE and
served as president of WFE during part
of this time.9 Georgoulis was also presi-
dent and chairman of the board of TIC
Services, a subsidiary of TICI which pro-
vided services to TICI and TICU including
"insurance, accounting, legal and tax
work, and payment of employee
salaries." 10
It is believed that during this five-year
period, neither Georgoulis nor any em-
ployee of TIC entities (TICI, TICU, and
TIC Services) was involved in or had
knowledge of the hazardous waste dis-
posal practices of WFE.i' However,
Georgoulis did exert direct control over
much of WFE's operations and manage-
ment.12 Georgoulis frequented the WFE
corporate offices and spoke daily with
WFE officers." He also was involved in
most of the personnel matters and had
final authority over the hiring of WFE em-
ployees." Furthermore, Georgoulis per-
sonally made a decision to "close and
consolidate some of WFE's opera-
tions."" As chairman of WFE's two-
member board of directors, Georgoulis
took part in most of the corporate
decisions. 16
During TIC's ownership of WFE, TICI
and TICU also exercised control over the
operations of WFE.i' TICI and TICU
management made many personnel deci-
sions at WFE.' 8 In addition, TIC Services
had a hand in WFE operations, including
paying WFE salaries and billing WFE for
1 68 F.3d 1082 (8th Cir. 1995).
2 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATIONS REFORMS FACT HEEt (May 25, 1995).
3 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1980).






























Redefining CERCLA Arranger Liability
reimbursement. "
In 1983, WFE refinanced and was
required to increase its board of directors
from two to five members. 20 Georgoulis
remained chairman of the board follow-
ing this change.21 WFE defaulted on the
refinancing loan in 1985 and was subse-
quently sold to Allied Products Corpora-
tion. 22  In 1988, the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
listed the HEC dumpsite on its National
Priorities List, and soon thereafter began
site remediation. 23 Both the EPA and Al-
lied provided response costs for this reme-
diation and brought individual cost
recovery actions against the defendants
for the hazardous waste contributed by
WFE.24
Georgoulis argued that CERCLA ar-
ranger liability does not apply to corpo-
rate officers and directors, "without proof
of any intentional participation in the ar-
rangement for disposal of the hazardous
substance.",2 TICI made the same argu-
ment for parent corporation liability, argu-
ing that "intentional participation in the
arrangement for disposal" of hazardous
waste is required before arranger liability
for parent corporations can be found un-
der CERCIA.2
The case was heard before the United
States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Iowa. 27 The District Court found in
favor of Allied and the EPA, and entered
partial summary judgment against TICI
and Georgoulis, holding the defendants
directly liable, under CERCLA, as arrang-
ers for the disposal of hazardous waste."
The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding in part and reversed in
part.29  According to the court of Ap-
peals, CERCLA imposes arranger liability
against corporate officers, directors, and
parent corporations where that entity had
"the authority to control and did in fact
exercise actual or substantial control, di-
rectly or indirectly, over the arrangement
for disposal, or the off-site disposal, of
hazardous substances."o
Ill. LEGAL HISTORY
A. Congress Enacts CERCLA
By the late 1970's, it was clear to
Congress that the United States was dot-
ted with hazardous waste disposal sites
in need of cleaning. The serious environ-
mental and health related risks posed by
these sites inspired the enactment of CER-
CIA in 1980. CERCLA lists four catego-
ries of parties that may be held
responsible for the response costs associ-
ated with the remediation of a particular
Superfund site. Those persons are: 1) the
current owner or operator of the facility;
2) the past owner or operator of the facil-
ity; 3) the person responsible for arrang-
ing the disposal or treatment of the
hazardous waste; and 4) the transporter
of the hazardous waste.3' "Persons," as
defined in CERCLA, includes both indi-
viduals and corporations.32
Liability under CERCIA is governed by§ 107 of the statute. Most statutes oper-
ate prospectively. CERCLA, however,
was enacted for the express purpose of
addressing hazards caused by past
waste disposal practices. Consequently,
it has been held to apply retroactively. In
addition, CERCLA has been interpreted to
impose strict liability, liability without
fault.33  Furthermore, most court cases
have held that CERCLA imposes joint and
several liability, meaning that any party
found responsible for cleanup at the site
can be liable for the entire cost of reme-
diation regardless of how little they con-
tributed.34 While each of the four
categories of parties that may be held
responsible for response costs under CER-
CIA appear to be treated equally in the
statute, courts have varied the standards
used and the liability imposed for each
group. The liability imposed on individ-
ual officers of parent corporations have
subsumed considerable litigation and
debate.
B. Officer Liability
Corporations were conceived for the
primary purpose of limiting the liability of
officers and shareholders.15 A corpora-
tion is a legal entity separate from its
owners and officers.31 Shareholder liabil-
ity, therefore, is limited by the amount of
19 Id.





25 Id. at 1084.
26 Id.
2 TIC Investment, 68 F.3d at 1083.
28 Id.
2 Id. at 1084.
30 Id. at 1087.
31 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
32 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1980).
3 Lynda J. Oswald & Cindy A. Schipani, CERCIA and the "Erosion" of Traditional Corporate Law Doctrine, 86 Nw. U.L. REv. 259, 265 (1992). 42 U.S.C.§ 9601(32) states "[t]he term 'liable' or 'liability' under this subchapter shall be construed to be the standard of liability which obtains under section 1321 of
Title 33." This is referring to the Clean Water Act which has been held to impose strict liability upon violators of the Act.
* Oswald & Schipani, supro note 33, at 265.
3s Id. at 262.
3 Id. at n 13.
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the individual shareholder's investment in
the corporation.17 Officers also are pro-
tected from corporate actions." This cor-
porate veil is necessary to encourage
commerce and free enterprise by protect-
ing corporate officers and shareholders
from some of the risks associated with
business ventures.39
This protection, however, is not abso-
lute. Officer that consent to or personally
participate "in the tortuous or illegal acts
of the corporation are not afforded pro-
tection under this traditional corporate
law doctrine.""o There must be actual
participation on the part of the officer
"through affirmative actions of direction,
sanction, or cooperation in the wrongful
acts of commission or omission. Merely
being an officer, as such, is insufficient to
create liability.42
Courts consistently have found officer
liability under CERCLA since its enactment
in 1980. Three separate theories have
been developed to address this issue.43
All three theories require a level of per-
sonal involvement in the tortuous acts, al-
though each seeks this involvement in a
different manner.
The first of these theories is the
"personal participation" theory.44 This
theory is best represented in U.S. v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical
Co., Inc. (NEPACCO).45 In NEPACCO,
the corporate officer in question was actu-
ally involved in the disposal practices, but
argued to the Eighth Circuit that there
should be no personal liability "because
he acted solely as a corporate officer or
employee."46 The court opined that the
officer was not being held liable because
of his position with NEPACCO, rather he
was "individually liable.., because he
personally arranged for the transportation
and disposal of hazardous substances." 7
The court, citing Donsco, Inc. v. Casper
Corp., stated "[a] corporate officer is in-
dividually liable for the torts he [or she]
personally commits [on behalf of the cor-
poration] and cannot shield himself [or
herself] behind a corporation when he [or
she] is an actual participant in the tort." 48
Two rationales have been used by
courts in applying the personal participa-
tion theory.4 9 Both the traditional corpo-
rate law doctrine and a reading of the
statutory language of CERCLA have been
cited.5 o The underlying principle of the
personal participation theory, however,
follows more closely with the traditional
corporate law doctrine, holding officers
liable for environmental torts in the same
manner that they would be held liable for
other torts in which they have personally
participated.51
The second theory used in addressing
corporate officer liability is the "control
theory."S2 This theory "focus[es] more
upon the officer's authority or ability to
direct corporate activities than upon the
officer's actual involvement in the unlaw-
ful activity."5 1 While this theory was
originally devised to hold an "operator"
liable, NEPACCO expanded the theory
to include liability against arrangers.54
The court in NEPACCO stated that "[i]t is
the authority to control" hazardous waste
disposal that is "critical under the statutory
scheme. "
Since NEPACCO, the control theory
has been somewhat refined in the Eighth
Circuit while remaining unchanged in
other circuits. The Eighth Circuit in U.S.
v. Vertac Chemical Corporation, 5 6
claimed the control theory alone was too
"broad [an] interpretation" of
NEPACCO, and held that the mere
authority to control was not adequate to
find liability as an arranger. 7 In U.S. v.
Gurley,5 1 the court also found this stan-
dard too broad, but in the context of op-
erator liability, not arranger liability,
requiring "some type of action or affirma-
tive conduct" to equate control of an op-
eration.59  It is, therefore, still
questionable how the control theory will
be applied to arrangers under CERCIA.
The last theory of officer liability under
CERCIA is the "prevention theory.""
38 Lynda J. Oswald, Strict Liability of Individuals Under CERCLA: A Normative Analysis, 20 B.C. ENWr. AFF. L. REv. 579, n. 8 (1993).
3 Oswald & Schipani, supra note 33, at 262.
4o Oswald, supro note 41. The corporation can also be held liable for the tortuous acts of its officers under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id.
A1 Id.
A Id.
A Oswald & Schipani, supro note 33, at 272-73.
44 Id. at 273, 275.
4 8 10 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
46 Id. at 744.
A Id.
48 NEPACCO, 8 10 F.2d at 744 (citing Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 606 (3d Cir. 1978)1.
4 Oswald & Schipani, supro note 33, at 279-80.
s Id.
5i Id. at 282.
52 Id.
sa3 Id. of 283.
s NEPACCO, 8 10 F.2d at 744.
5 Id.
- 46 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 1995).
- Id. at 811.
58 43 F.3d 1188, 1193 (8th Cir. 1994).
59 Id_
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This theory has had little effect upon CER-
CLA cases and has not surfaced in the
Eighth Circuit. Where applied, courts
appear to focus on an officer's "ability to
prevent harm from improper waste activi-
ties." 6 Officer's that attempt to prevent
improper disposal practices will be
treated more lenient by courts in assess-
ing liability, thus creating an "incentive"
for officers to practice proper waste han-
dling procedures.62
C. Parent Corporation Liability
The history of parent corporation li-
ability under CERCLA can be traced to
cases dealing with operator liability.
These cases adopt three different tests; an
"actual control test", an
"authority-to-control test", and a piercing
the corporate veil test.63 The actual con-
trol test was used by the First Circuit in
U.S. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., /nc." The
court held that mere ownership and an
ability to control was insufficient to im-
pose operator liability.65 At a minimum,
the court stated, an "active involvement in
the activities of the subsidiary" is
required. 6
The second test, the authority-to-control
test, is a less stringent minority view that
only requires a "capability to control." 67
The Fourth Circuit adopted this test in Nu-
rod, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons
6 Oswald & Schipani, supro note 33, at 291.
Co.,68 finding operator liability where
actual control was not exercised. Here,
the mere existence of an authority to con-
trol was sufficient for liability.69
The third test, which is also a minority
view, finds liability only if the court can
reach the parent corporation by piercing
the corporate veil.70 The first appellate
court to apply this test was the Fifth Circuit
in Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. T L. James
& Co., Inc.," which held that the parent
corporation must control the subservient
corporation to an extent that it does not
act on its own interests, but operates
solely to benefit the parent corporation.72
Again, these cases have dealt with
operator liability and have not addressed
arranger liability for parent corporations.
Furthermore, the treatment of parent cor-
poration liability under CERCLA in gen-
eral has yet to be decided by most
courts. The Eighth Circuit in TIC ad-
dressed the issue of arranger liability for
both parent corporations and corporate
officers as a matter of first impression.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Eighth Circuit Court in TIC began
their analysis by categorizing the defen-
dant's liability, indicating that they were
deciding the issue of arranger liability as
a matter of first impression.74  First, the
court addressed the issue of Georgoulis'
liability as an arranger. ' Georgoulis
argued that the appropriate standard for
arranger liability is one of specific intent,
noting that he had no knowledge of TICs
disposal activities and therefore lacked
the intent necessary to find liability.76
Georgoulis also claimed that according
to the holding in Gurley, arranger liability
can be found only where the defendant
has the authority to control disposal prac-
tices, and exercises that authority over the
disposal practices of the corporation."
The Eighth Circuit rejected this argu-
ment. Looking at the legislative history of
CERCLA for guidance, the court noted
that Congress, first and foremost, wanted
to make sure those persons responsible
for the disposal of hazardous substances
were the parties paying the site remedia-
tion costs.7 8 The court also noted that
Congress wished to prevent those respon-
sible persons from avoiding liability by
"closing their eyes" to disposal
practices./
Next, the court spent a considerable
amount of time analyzing the decision in
Gurley.80 The defendants had argued
that Gurley supported their claim against
arranger liability, but the court turned that
contention around and said that Gurley in
fact supported arranger liability against
Georgoulis. 8 ' The Gurley court had dis-
tinguished the individual in that case, a
non-officer, non-director, non-shareholder
Kurt A. Strassert & Denise Rodosevich, Seeing the Forest for the Trees in CERCIA Liability, 10 YALEJ. ON REG. 493, 5 11 (1993).
Oswald & Schiponi, supro note 33, at 293-94.
Lansford-CoaldoleJoint Water Authority v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1221 (1993); U.S. v. TIC Investment, 68 F.3d 1082, 1091 (8th Cir. 1995).910 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1990).
Id.
Id.
tansford-Cooldale, 4 F. 3d at 1221.
966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir. 1992).
Id.
U.S. v. TIC Investment, 68 F.3d 1082, 1091 (8th Cir. 1995).
893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 83-84.
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employee, from an individual holding a
position as officer, director, or share-
holder, stating "officers, directors, or
shareholders are more likely to cause a
company to dispose of hazardous
waste."8 2 The court in TIC agreed with
that statement, noting that such a policy is
expressly aimed at closing "loophole[s]
for powerful individuals like Geor-
goulis." 83 The court stated that allowing
individuals with "virtually unlimited" con-
trol over a corporation to escape liaiblity
by shutting their eyes to the corporation's
disposal practices would be unjust, par-
ticularly since an employee with limited
decision-making authority could still be
held liable as an arranger.8" Again, the
court maintained the policy justification
that the goal of CERCLA is to "place the
ultimate responsibility for clean up on
those responsible."" The court also
agreed with a point raised by the United
States that a specific intent standard
would protect individuals who control the
"day -to-day... budgets, production, and
capital investment," but fail to consider
the "cost-cutting disposal practices" of the
corporation.86  The standard con-
ceived by the Eighth Circuit in TIC im-
poses CERCLA arranger liability upon a
"corporate officer or director if he or she
had the authority to control and did in
fact exercise actual or substantial control,
directly or indirectly, over the arrange-
ment for disposal, or the off-site disposal,
of hazardous substances." 87 Such a
standard, claimed the court, dispels the
defendant's argument that every chief offi-
cer with authority will automatically be
liable as an arranger." In applying this
standard, the court held that a
"fact-intensive examination of the totality
of the circumstances" must be
conducted."
The court accordingly applied such
an examination to the facts of TIC.' The
control that Georgoulis exerted over
WFE, the court found, did not allow oth-
ers to have any authority over corporate
decisions, including decisions concerning
the disposal of hazardous substances."1
While the court's decision stated that
Georgoulis would have avoided liability
had he delegated decision-making
authority among corporate employees,
such a delegation did not take place.92
Instead, the court found that Georgoulis
controlled "virtually every aspect of
WFE's operations" and that it was
"therefore beyond genuine dispute that
he exercised substantial indirect control
over the disposal arrangement."93 In the
end, the court held that there was suffi-
cient evidence to establish arranger liabil-
ity against Georgoulis.94
Having settled the issue of corporate
officer liability, the court turned to the is-
sue of parent corporation liability against
TICI and TICU." Here the court simply
applied the same standard discussed
above for officer liability.9 6 They held
that arranger liability can be found
against "a parent corporation if the par-
ent had the authority to control and exer-
cised actual or substantial control, directly
or indirectly, over the arrangement for
disposal, or the off-site disposal, of the
subsidiary's hazardous substances.""
The same "fact-intensive inquiry" util-
ized against Georgoulis was used
against TICI and TICU to determine if
there was sufficient evidence to support a
finding of parent corporation liability.98
In this instance, however, the court held
the facts were not sufficient to warrant
summary judgment, and reversed the
judgment of the district court."
V. COMMENT
Since its enactment in 1978, CER-
CLA has been criticized by commenta-
tors. Many claim the lame-duck session
of Congress that enacted CERCLA left the
language of the statute too vague and
open for judicial interpretation. " This
vagueness, they claim, has led to an ero-
sion of the traditional corporate law doc-
trine. Although it is inevitable that TIC
will be looked upon by these commenta-
tors as furthering that erosion, such an
interpretation would be incorrect.
The debate as to whether CERCLA
liability should extend to officers and par-
ent corporations is really one of compet-
ing public policies. On one side stand
those in support of a more extensive liabil-
ity scheme, desiring a cleaner environ-
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and safety of everyone, while on the
other stand those who argue that corpo-
rate officers, directors, shareholders, and
parent corporations should be protected
from liability, erroneously maintaining that
the formation of corporations will be dis-
couraged, and the public interest in pro-
moting commerce and free trade will be
harmed. A thorough analysis of TIC
shows how the court considered and
dealt with both of these underlying
policies
The traditional corporate law doc-
trine, as discussed, supro, protects corpo-
rate officers and parent corporations from
liability unless there is actual participation
on the part of the officer or parent corpo-
ration. The decision in TIC clearly does
not depart from this principle. The court
carefully set out the standard for arranger
liability so as to protect officers and par-
ent corporations from incurring liability
based solely on their position within the
corporation. TIC requires control, direct
or indirect, over the disposal of hazard-
ous substances before liability can be
found. This can, in no way, however, be
seen as an erosion of either CERCLA's
liability scheme or traditional corporate
law doctrine. Nowhere within the ar-
ranger provision of CERCLA is there any
language limiting liability to only those
who directly arrange for the disposal of
hazardous substances and nowhere
within the traditional corporate law doc-
trine is there a loophole for those officers
and parent corporations who indirectly
commit torts. Those responsible, either
directly or indirectly, can be held liable
whether under TIC or traditional corpo-
rate law.
Opponents of officer and parent cor-
poration liability under CERCLA argue
that past court decisions have held offi-
cers and parent corporations liable based
on their mere position to the corporate
PRP. That is, they claim courts do not
look at the actions of that officer or parent
corporation, rather they simply find liabil-
ity by determining whether the officer or
parent corporation had the authority to
control the disposal. This, however, is
not an accurate representation of the de-
cision in TIC; TIC created a standard that
requires more. Not only does TIC pre-
vent the mere authority to control from cre-
ating liability, but it calls for a
fact-intensive inquiry to determine whether
that level of control was "substantial."
This protects the innocent officer or parent
corporation that has delegated most of
his or her authority and has retained little
or no control over the disposal of the haz-
ardous waste. It requires a court to look
past mere titles by determining who had
the authority to control, as well as who
did control the disposal practices of the
corporation. By finding this origin of con-
trol, courts will be able to better assess
who is truly liable and responsible for the
improper disposal.
Another argument opponents of offi-
cer and parent corporation liability pose
is that protecting the corporate form will
promote commerce and free trade.
While this may be true as a general state-
ment, it has no application in this context.
If an officer or parent corporation alters its
corporate activity for fear of arranger li-
ability then CERCLA will have served the
additional beneficial purpose of deterring
harmful behavior. While CERCLA nor-
mally deters the acting arranger from mis-
handling hazardous waste, an extension
of CERCLA liability to corporate officers
and parent corporations would deter
those who set policy, guide the decision
making process, and make management
decisions for the corporation from ever
becoming arrangers. This will ultimately
decrease the amount of hazardous waste
entering Superfund sites. Besides acting
as a general deterrent, Congress itself
has stated that CERCLA liability would be
beneficial to the economy by encourag-
ing the internalization of costs. 01  By
requiring corporations to properly dispose
of hazardous substances during produc-
tion, the market price of goods will ade-
quately reflect their production costs. 102
In addition, Congress has stressed that it
will cost a corporation less to implement
and utilize proper disposal practices than
it will to pay Superfund remediation
costs. 103
It is clear that the court's holding in
TIC is consistent with both the traditional
purpose of CERCLA as a remedial statute
and traditional corporate law doctrine.
The liability scheme formulated in TIC will
prevent responsible parties from escaping
liability while equally protecting innocent
parties from incurring liability. Since the
enactment of CERCLA, the Eighth Circuit
is the first to adopt a solid standard for
arranger liability that effectively employs
both these policies. Although TIC refers
specifically to corporate officer and par-
ent corporation liability, this standard
could easily be expanded to encompass
directors, shareholders, and most other
PRP's that would potentially be liable as
arrangers under CERCLA.
VI. CONctusioN
Despite potentially competing public
policies, it is overwhelmingly clear that
the public desires to eliminate the health,
safety, and environmental risks created at
Superfund sites. Congress acknowl-
edged this with the enactment of CER-
CIA, and the court in TIC reaffirmed this
desire in its decision. The Eighth Circuit
has finally settled the long overdue ques-
tion of arranger liability. Hopefully, this
decision will become the benchmark
other jurisdictions will adopt in the future.
"01 Michael P. Healy, Direct Liability for Hazardous Substance Cleanups Under CERCLA: A Comprehensive Approach, 42 Case W. Res. 65, 79-80 (1992)
(citing S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-10 (1980)).
102 Id. at 80.
103 Id
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